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ARTICLES 
THE POLITICS OF ADVERTISING 
LEE LOEVlNGER* 
Once upon a tune It was respectable to be engaged m busmess m the 
Uruted States. Today public oplll1on experts tell us that busmess IS 
held m low esteem by the majorIty of people.l Self-styled public mterest 
groups claIm a copYrIght on respectability and speak of busmess as 
though It were a SOCIal disease and advertlsmg as though It were slighdy 
worse than skyJackmg. While castigauon ranges across the field of 
busmess acuvity broadly enough to aVOId any claIm of discnmmauon, 
some of the most VIgorous attacks are mounted agamst adverusmg. The 
CrIUCISm IS epItomIZed by the charge of an adverusmg man that our 
culture IS rotten and that advenlsmg has helped make It SO and IS con-
tmumg to make It worse.2 Woven through the CrItlCISmS are demands 
for a vanety of reforms and regulauons, rangmg from proposals to pro-
• B.A., JD., Uruversity of Minnesota. Parmer, Hogan & Hartson, WashIngton, D. C., 
Fonner ComnusslOner, Federal CommurucatIons ComnusslOn; Fonner AsSOCIate JustIce, 
Minnesota Supreme Court. 
Tlus Arocle IS a slightly edited versIon of a paper presented to the InternatIonal 
Radio and TeleVISIon SOCIety at the Waldorf-Astona Hotel, New York, N.Y., on 
January 4, 1973. The editIng has been confined to changes of , wording and constructIon 
and the additIon of fOOOlotes; the substance IS unchanged. Although the paper was 
ongmally drafted In the latter part of 1972, events SInce that orne have strongly reIn-
forced the conclusIOns reached and the VIews expressed. The OpImons In the case of 
ColumbIa BroadcastIng System v. DemocratIc Nat'l COIruruttee, 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973), 
appear very nearly to establish the thesIS urged here: Government actIon to requIre the 
broadcastIng of partIcular VIews In the commercIal area IS InconsIStent WIth or contrary 
to the mandate of the first amendment. 
1. See, e.g., BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 16, 1972, at 70. Numerous public opImon polls 
-report declirung public confidence In and respect for "bIg bUSIness." 
2. BUSINESS WEEK, June 10, 1972, at 46. 
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lllbit varIOUS lands of advertIsmg and to limIt the amount of advertIsmg 
generally, through proposals to requrre "correctIve," or self..:mcnmmat-
mg, advertISmg as well as sCIentIfic substantIatIon for all advertIsmg 
claIffiS, to a proposal that every broadcast advertISement be followed 
or matched by a counter-advertIsement presumably contradictIhg what-
ever claImS are made m the advertISement. Strangely enough, It appears 
that the attacks are mcreasmg at the very tIme that performance IS 
ImproVIng. 
The counter-advertIsmg proposal IS potentIally the most far-reachmg 
of the varIOUS attacks. Its genealogy 15 farrly clear, ongihanng wIth the 
decIsIOn of the Federal CommumcatIons CommIssIon m 1949 that broad-
casters could express editonal 0p1ll1ons on licensed facilitIes but that they 
must also provIde a farr opportumty for the expressIOn of opposmg or 
contrastmg VIews on controversIal ISsues of public Importance.3 ThIS 
prmcIple, whIch came to be known as the "Farrness Doctrme," until 
1967 was applied only to the diSCUSSIOn of major politIcal and SOCIal 
ISSues. In that year, the FCC declared that the Farrness Doctrme ap-
plied to CIgarette advertIsmg to the extent of requrrmg public servIce 
announcements warnmg of the dangers of CIgarette smokmg.4 The 
ComffilSsIon 0pImon qUIte expliCItly and emphatIcally declared that the 
SItuatIOn WIth respect to CIgarettes was "umque." In 1964 there had 
been a report by a Surgeon General's AdVISOry CommIttee warmng that 
ctgarette smolang was hazardous to health, and m 1965 Congress had 
enacted a statute requrrmg a warnmg of such hazard to be carned on all 
CIgarette packages. The FCC brushed aSIde the argument that applica-
tIon of the Farrness Doctrme to commercIal advertISmg was an un-
warranted and dangerous extensIOn by saymg that It did not know of 
any other advertIsed product to wruch the ruling would be applicable, 
that the ruling was limIted to CIgarettes, and that the ruling did not 
Imply that "any appeal to the ComffilSsion by a vocal mmonty will 
suffice to classify advertISmg of a product as controversIal and of public 
Importance." 5 
Although the CIgarette ruling of the FCC was sustamed by the Court 
of Appeals for the ThStflct of ColumbIa CirCUIt on the basIS urged by 
the FCC that the SItuatIOn was umque, G the same court, withm three 
3. EditonaIizmg by Broadcast Llcensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). 
4. TelevlSlon Statton WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967); Cigarette AdvertlSmg, 9 
F.C.C.2d 921 (1967). 
5. Cigarette Advernsmg, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 943 (1967). 




years, held that the ComIlllSsIOn could not aVOId applymg the F arrness 
Doctrme to other commercIal adverusements. Thus, It was held that 
reply tune under the F arrness Doctrme was reqUIred for commercIals 
of a department store willch was the obJect of a uruon boycott7 and for 
commercIals adverusmg illgh powered cars and leaded illgh octane 
gasoline.8 
As complamts agamst advertlSmg under the Farrness Doctrme m-
creased dramatically, the ComIlllSsion began to be concerned about the 
growmg extensIOn of that prmClple and mstItuted a general mqurry 
mto the entire subJect.9 In January 1972, the Federal Trade ComffilsslOn 
filed a statement m the FCC Farrness Doctrme mqurry advocatIng that 
the FCC reqUIre all broadcasters to provIde substantial amounts of tune, 
both free and paId, for regularly scheduled "counter-adverusmg" on a 
broad scale. Tills proposal IS still bemg debated and consldered.l° 
The FTC counter-advertIsmg proposal echoes sunilar schemes urged 
by other busmess CritiCS and has engendered support from most of the 
militant anti-establishment camps. Of all the attacks on advertISmg, tills 
proposal IS the most basIC, the most bold, and the most patently political. 
Its potential benefits and dangers are not so ObVIOUS, however, and ap-
praIsal requIres detailed analySIS. 
On first tmpresslOn there IS plausibility to the argument that SInce 
the public IS exposed to a vast amount of advertISIng urgmg the purchase 
of products or servICes, there should be comparable opportumty pro-
VIded for those who WISh to urge contrary VIews. Nevertheless, when 
the proposal IS reduced to specifics and exammed closely, ItS plausibility 
disappears, VIrtually all valid conSIderations are seen to militate agamst 
It, and tmplicatIons are disclosed reachIng far beyond broadcastmg and 
advertISIng and deep Into our political life. 
7. Retail Store Employees Uruon v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
8. Fnends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C; Crr. 1971), on remtmd, 33 
F.C.C.2d 648 (1972). 
9. Alan F Neckntz, 29 F.C.C.2d 807 (1971). 
10. It appears that for several reasons the counter-advernsmg proposal IS less favor-
ably regarded than It was several months ago. A new member of the FTC, Mayo J. 
Thompson, has expressed reservattons about the proposal, stanng that "the pracnce 
mIght well create more problems than It solves." BNA A.NTrrnusr & TRADE REG. REP. No. 
618, at D-1 (June. 19, 1973). The term of Nicholas Johnson, the FCC commISSIoner 
most notonously hostile to broadcasnng and favorable to counter-advernsmg, has 
ended, and the Wlute House has made It clear that he will not be reappomted. 
Furthermore, the deCISIon of the Supreme Court in ColumbIa Broadcasnng System v. 
Democrattc Nat'l CommIttee, 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973), sustammg the FCC In Its reJectton 
of claImS to a nght of COmm~!CIal access, has diverted attentton from the proposal. 
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1. The Reasons Urged for Counter-Advertmng Are Logtcally 
Fallaczous 
The mstItutIon of general counter-advertIsmg IS urged by the FTC 
on the grounds that there are faults ill advertIsmg wIth whIch the FTC 
cannot cope effectIvely because of Its limIted tools and resources. Faults 
specIfied by the FTC are advertIsmg claIms whIch are false or deceptIve, 
whIch are truthful but mcomplete, or whIch illvolve controversIal opm-
Ion or eVIdence. Although the FTC states that not all commercIals raIse 
the kmd of Issues or illvolve the type of problems that make counter-
adverusmg appropnate, It also asserts that the measures It proposes are 
necessItated by advertIsmg whIch IS silent about any negatIve aspects of a 
product, a charactenstIc the FTC urges IS mherent m all commercIal 
advertISmg. Thus, the FTC IS Itself mconslstent and contradictory m 
assertIng that ItS proposal IS responsIve to problems created only by 
certam types of advertISIng but that such problems are Inherent m all 
advertISIng. 
In any event, neIther of these mconslStent premISes logIcally supports 
the proposal. The FTC does not allege that the advertISIng faults It 
IdentIfies are confined to broadcast commercIals. However, SInce coun-
ter-advertISIng IS proposed only for broadcastIng, It IS not necessarily 
responsIve to the problems whIch allegedly requIre ItS InStitutIOn. In-
deed, the advertISIng VIces noted by the FTC seem to prOVIde more an 
excuse for beratIng advertisers than a baSIS for proposIng some partIcular 
remedy, SInce there IS nothIng In the proposal whIch would make 
counter-advertISIng responsIve, or even relevant, to any particular defect 
In advertISIng or clrums. 
For thIs reason, counter-advertISIng IS not really relevant to the FaIr-
ness DoctrIne, whIch IS ItS ostensible logIcal support. The FaIrness Doc-
trIne applies only to specIfic ISSUes and requIres that OppOSIng VIew-
POInts be Identified WIth respect to each ISsue and be gIVen a faIr oppor-
tumty for broadcast expressIon. The FTC, however, proposes measures 
whIch would permIt the expreSSIOn of speCIal VIews WIthout any pro-
VISIon for Insunng that Issues be IdentIfied, that the opportumty for 
expresSIOn of vlewpomts be balanced, or that any of the counter-ad-
vertISmg be responSIve or even relevant to any particular advertIsmg 
ExammatIon of the FTC statement to the FCC, as well as other recent 
FTC statements, discloses not only that the FTC IS not really Interested 
In a FaIrness Doctrme kmd of balancmg but also that ItS counter-adver-
tiSIng proposal IS not really directed at meetmg partIcular flaws of ad-
verusmg. Rather, the FTC IS now attemptIng to move away from the 
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unglamorous Job of policmg advemsmg, wluch IS Its statutory funcnon, 
and IS undertakIng to promote a general educatlonal program to provIde 
consumers wIth all the Informatlon necessary to enable them to mak~ 
mformed chOIces among products.ll Tlus may, or may not, be a SOCIal-
ly desIrable obJectlve; however, It IS not Withm the scope of the Farr:-
ness Doctrme or Withm the statutory Jurisdictlon of eIther the FCC ,or 
.the FTC. Thus, the argument offered by the FTC m support of ItS 
ptoposalIS merely a camouflage and does not lOgIcally support the pro-
.posal at all. 
Indeed, the kmd of controversy to wluch counter-advertlSmg relates 
IS not the kInd of controversy covered by the Farrness Doctrme. Ad-
:vertlsmg IS advocacy wluch seeks to persuade a consumer to buy a par-
tlcular brand of product (or servIce) or attempts to establish IdentIfica-
tlon of a partlcular brand With some favorable aSSOCIatlon m the con-
sumer mmd. In the sense that counter-advertIsmg attempts to present 
counter-arguments or establish unfavorable aSSOCIatlon, It IS like com-
petltlve advertlSmg. Thus, to some degree, all competltlve advertlsmg 
IS counter-advertlSmg, smce the Issues or arguments mvolved all are 
rumed at the consumer deCISIOn to buy or not to buy partIcular products 
or servIces. However, the Farrness Doctrme applies only to contro-
versIal ISSUes of public Importance. It IS difficult to discern how the 
'consumer deCISIon to buy or not to buy partIcular product brands can 
nse to the level of an ISSUe of public lffip0rtance, and neIther the FTC 
nor any other counter-advertIsmg advocate has yet suggested a means 
of bndgmg tlus lOgIcal chasm. 
11. The FTC's desIre to remedy sItuatIons m wruch consumers "have no means of 
evaluatIng the products and servIces that are offered to them [while] the business-
man wIth whom they deal has all of the relevant mformatIon " IS disclosed by the 
author's notes of remarks by COmmIssIoner Mary Gardiner Jones on Oct. 14, 1970, and 
of her address to the AustIn AdvertISmg CIinlc of the Uruverslty of Texas School of 
CommurucatIon and the AustIn Advernsmg Club, AustIn, Tex., Feb. 21, 1972. Notes 
of the author also reveal that Gerald Tham, AssIstant Director, Bureau of Consumer 
,ProtectIon, on May 12, 1971, while discussmg the WhIte House Conference on Food, 
NutrItIon and Health, remarked that "if food comparues and advertISers do not assume 
theIr responsibility for presentIng factual nutrItIonal mformatIon to consumers, and 
particularly to children, regulatory agencIes may reqUIre them to do so. See 
also Pfizer, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. 8819 (July 11, 1972), BNA ANnntuST & 
TRADE REG. REp. No. 572, at D-1 (July 18, 1972). In the Statement of the Fed-
eral Trade CommIssIon before the FCC, ill F.C.C. Docket No. 19260, the FTC 
Stated, mter alia: "In additIon to bemg truthful, It would be desIrable for adverosmg 
to be 'complete' 10 the sense that It makes available all essentIal pIeces of mformatIon 
concerrung the advernsed product, I.e. all of the mformatIon wruch consumers need 
ill order to make ratIonal chOICes among competIng brands of desIred products." 
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Furthermore, the FTC suggestion that there IS somethmg bad about 
the fact that advertIsed products may have any "undisclosed negative 
aspects" and that It could force "all advertisers to disclose all such 
aspects" IS not only illogIcal but silly While the FTC IS gIVmg out 
WIth mod terms and rappmg wIth jive talk calculated to send con-
temporary cats, there IS no mdicatlon that It has even a: speakmg ac-
qua:mtance WIth the vast body of knowledge, thought, and wIsdom 
accumulated m the fields of philosophy, SCIence, and law Apparently 
that's JUst for squares. DIsregarding for the moment the limItations 
of tlme m broadcastmg and space m publishmg, the notlon that an ad-
vertISer could state all negative aspects of a product or all mformatIOn 
needed to make a rational chOIce between products IS naIve at best. The 
data that are, or may be, negative or relevant to a product choIce are 
literally mfirute. 
Moreover, some facts are ObVIOusly more Important to a buyer than 
others; relatIve Importance, like relevance, IS a subjective matter, de-
pendent upon the buyer'S desrres, purposes, alternatives, tastes, temper-
ament, and a host of other factors. What IS negative or relevant m the 
chOIce among products IS not a fixed, obJective, or determmable thmg. 
One buyer may prefer a WIde vanety of relatIvely cheap clothes; 
another may want a smgle garment of the rughest quality and pnce and 
exclUSIve desIgn. Some may trunk a moderate varIety of medium-pnced 
clothes IS best. In varymg crrcumstances, different factors may be rele-
vant for any mdividual. The combmatIon and determmatIOn of elements 
of chOIce IS as WIdely vanable as the number of mdividuais. It IS pre-
sumptuous to the pomt of bemg false and deceptive for the FTC, or 
any other agency, to suggest that It can determme or specify all of the 
negative or relevant elements m a buymg chOIce. 
The whole truth WIth respect to any phYSIcal product may mvolve 
every aspect of human knowledge. Even that, as truly WIse men know, 
IS but a tmy fraction of what mIght be called the "whole truth." Sir 
Isaac Newton, who contributed as much to human knowledge as any 
man who has ever lived, sald of rus own efforts: "I do not know what I 
may appear to the world; but to myself I seem to have been only like 
a boy playmg on the seashore, and divertlng myself m now and then 
finding a smoother pebble or a prettIer shell than ordinary, whilst the 
great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me." 12 The FTC 
should gIve greater heed to the warrung of William Penn: "Truth often 
12. D. BREWSTER, MEMOIRS OF NEWTON, vol. II, ch. 27 (1855). 
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:suffers more by the heat of Its defenders, than from the arguments of Its 
opposers." 13 
The fact that not all negatIve aspects 'Of a product can be ascertamed, 
specmed, and disclosed does not mean that some shauld nat be. It daes 
mean, hawever, that thase charactenstIcs whIch are lffipartant enaugh ta 
requIre disclosure m advemsmg must be ascertamed and specmed, prad-
uct by praduct. ThIS IS what the FTC IS suppased to do and what It 
has ample authonty to do. Althaugh the assertIon that advertlSmg m Its 
present form daes nat disclase all negatIve aspects of advertised praducts 
JS necessarily true and will always be true, It has no SIgnificance. Since 
It IS lffipassible ta ascertam or specify all negatIve aspects 'Of a praduct, 
It IS a lOgICal certamty that they cannot all be disclased. It necessarily 
follDws that caunter-advertIsmg wauld nat disclase all negatIve aspects 
'Of any praduct. Mareover, there IS nD assurance that caunter-advertIS-
mg wauld address Itself to lffiportant aspects 'Of partIcular praducts. If 
the FTC believes that there are negatIve aspects of products whIch re-
qUIre disclasure, It shauld nat attempt ta evade ItS statutory respanSI-
bility 'Of performmg the difficult and arduous task 'Of determmmg such 
aspects and specifymg them praduct by praduct. 
The argument that the FTC daes not have adequate resaurces to per-
form Its responsibilitIes IS essentIally Irrelevant ta ItS praposal ta reqUIre 
counter-advemsmg. The.FTC, like, all ather gavernment agenCIes, IS 
allacated that share of our limIted natIanal resaurces whIch the public, 
actIng thraugh ItS representatIves m Cangress, determmes ta be appra-
prIate and reasanable. All ather segments of SOCIety, mcluding advems-
ers, braadcasters, and the public, also have limIted resaurces. The FTC 
IS nat autharIZed or warranted to apprapnate the resaurces of 'Others 
not subJect ta ItS JurISdictIan, such as braa~casters 'Or advertIsers agamst 
whom na charge has been made, far purpases whIch It approves 'Or 
-deems especIally warthy If FTC resources really are madequate ta 
perfarm a praper task, It shauld seek additIonal resaurces fram the bady 
whIch created and controls It. LlffiltatIans ·af FTC resources da nat 
Justify the apprapnatIon far ItS purposes 'Of -the resaurces of others. In 
pnvate life there IS a nasty name far such a pracess. The fact that the 
FTC senously 'Offers such a reasan m su,ppart 'Of ItS counter-advemsmg 
propasal further suggests the absence of any lOgical foundatIan for the 
praposal. 
13. W PENN, SOME FRUITS OF'SoLITUDE (1693). 
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2. Cownter-Advertmng Would, Destroy the Economtc Foundatton of 
Broadcasttng 
Argument ill favor of the counter-advertIsmg proposal seems to ong-
mate in a land of mtellectual vacuum where no account IS taken of the 
fact that four mmus two equals two, and does not remam four. To gIve 
ratIonal consIderatIon to tills proposal, It IS necessary to recogruze some 
ObVIOUS and SImple 'facts, most lffiportantly that broadcastmg tIme IS 
limIted so that nothmg can be added WIthout subtractmg somethmg else. 
CommerCIal broadcastmg IS completely dependent upon advertISmg 
revenue. It has no other sIgmficant source of mcome. The only alterna-
tIve method of financmg developed m tills country IS government sup-
port or subSIdy, the problems 'Of whIch are the subject of contmumg 
public debate and do not need retelling here. It IS s.Igruficant to note, 
however, that smce the counter-advertIsmg proposal does not discuss 
the multItude of problems and cost to the taxpayers willch would reqUITe 
analYSIS if broadcastIng were to be changed from a commerCIal system 
to one 'supported by the government, It ostensibly seeks no change In 
the system of commerCIal broadcasnng. 
Counter-advertIsmg would affect commerCIal broadcastmg m two 
ways. First, it would Impose a cost by ItS encroachment on commerCIal 
and broadcasnng trnle. Second, It would result m a loss to the extent 
ii: would drIve advertIsers out of broadcastmg. 
The direct cost Imposed by counter-advertIsmg on broadcastmg 
would depend upon the amount of response tIme reqUITed. The pro-
portIon most gen'er-ally discussed and advocated IS twenty percent of 
all commerCIal tIme. Counter-advertIsmg advocates would surely not 
be satIsfied WIth less. The nme. for such counter-advertIsmg would 
have tQ be diverted from tIme now devoted eIther to commerCIals or 
prqgrammmg. If .taken from commerCIal tIme, It would decrease pro-
portIOnately the revenue from commerCIals. If taken from programmmg 
tIme, counter-advertlsmg would mcrease clutter, program mterruptIons, 
and audience annoyance and would decrease advertIsmg effectiveness.14 
Since both the FCC and mdustry code authontIes are seeking to limIt 
program mterruptIons and clutter, It seems most likely that tIme for 
counter-advertIsmg would come from that currently devoted to com-
merCials. 
14. By far the most common complaInt about broadcast commerCIals IS that there 
are Just too many of them, WIth about 70 percent of all classes of VIewers 'expressmg 
t1us opmIon. ROBERT T. BOWER, TELEVISION AND THE l'PBlJ.c...84 (1973). SUJllso ROPER 
ORGANIZATION, WHAT PEoPLE TmNK OF TELEVISION AND OnmR' MASS.' MED~A, 1959-1972, 
at 24 (1973). 
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T akmg total profit as a percentage of gross revenue, the overall profit 
margm of the televlSlon mdustry IS under twenty percent. However, 
the profit margm of televISIOn networks IS only about five percent and 
that of radio less than ten percent, as calculated on the basIS of pub-
lished FCC data.15 If twenty percent of commercIal tnne were diverted 
to counter-advertISmg, mdustry profit would be elimmated, even If no 
other commercIal revenue were lost. Although a myrIad of detailed 
calculations can be made as to the cost of counter-advertISIng under 
varIOUS linntatIons, the result under relatively severe linntatIons would 
still be devastaung. Thus, even if counter-advertISmg were linnted to 
some products whIch have been the subject of the most vIgorous attacks, 
such as automobiles, gasoline, cereals, drugs, and detergents, and even 
if It were placed entIrely m time diverted from commercIals for these 
products on a ·one-to-five baSIS and restncted to televIsIOn network com-
merCIals, It would cost the televISIon networks about $68 million an-
nually, whIch IS more than theIr combmed pre-tax profits of $50 million. 
Thus, on the baSIS of direct costs alone, counter-advertlsmg m an amount 
suffiCIent to satisfy the ffiIDlffium demands of 1tS advocates would elim-
mate broadcastmg prpfit. 
The total effect of counter-advertlSmg on broadcasung would prob-
ably be even more severe. Since 1t IS proposed to apply only to broad-
castmg, It would certamly dnve many, and possibly all, advertISers mto 
other media. To reach thIs conclUSIOn, 1t need be assumed only that 
advertIsers are rational m protectmg theIr own self-mterests. However, 
speculation on thIs pomt 1S unnecessary, smce spokesmen for major 
national advert1sers have already announced that if counter-advertISmg 
measures were limited to products whIch are advertised on broadcast 
media, they would aVOId the verbal stomng m the market place of coun-
ter-advertIsmg slffiply by usmg other media. Moreover, if a product 
could be attacked through counter-advertIsmg whether 1t is ~dvertlSed 
on broadcastmg or only through nonbroadcast media, then an adver-
tIser would do best to stop paymg for broadcast advertlsmg and demand 
free reply tnne under the Farrness Doctrme when hIs product is attacked. 
No matter what mechamcs or rationalizations are employed, counter-
advertISmg would result unav01dably m the decreased attractiveness of 
broadcastIng as an advertISmg medium, WIth an mevitable decrease ill the 
amount of broadcast advertlsmg. The magnitude of such loss is not 
crucial to the mqurry, smce the dir.ect~?_sts __ of _sl!PE!~g 1lII1~_,f~1:" 
15. These figures were obtamed from the 37th Annual Report· uf the F.C.C: for the 
Fiscal Year 1971, at 151 (televlSlon) & 169 (radio). 
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counter-advernsmg alone would wIpe out current profit margms; the 
loss of revenue resultmg from advertIsers departmg the media would 
slffiply make broadcastmg even more unprofitable. 
ExperIence wIth CIgarette counter-adVertlSlllg buttresses the conclu-
SIons reached above. First, counter-advertIsmg cannot be limIted by 
the FCC to any partlcular product or applicatIOn, smce the courts have 
lllsIsted that It be applied to the full extent of whatever logIcal ratIOnale 
upon whIch It IS adopted. Second, demands for counter-advertIsmg es-
calate With ItS use, and even the cessatlon of advertISmg at whIch It IS 
directed does not termmate demands for counter-advertlslllg Thrrd, 
counter-adverusmg does dimInISh the demand for a product at whIch 
It IS directed. Finally, counter-advertlSmg does drIve adverusers out of 
broadcastIng. After the CIgarette manufacturers began to feel the 
effects 'Of broadcast counter-advernsmg, they told Congress they would 
welcome a statute forbIdding broadcast advertlSlng of CIgarettes, and 
such a statute was enacted. Although distributors of other products may 
achIeve slIDilar results by some other method, there can be no reasonable 
doubt that counter-adverusmg would drIve most, If not all, advertIsers 
away from broadcastmg to more hospItable media. 
3. Counter-Advertmng Would Cause a DeterIOration of Broadcast Pro-
grarmnmg and Journalism 
There IS literally no way m whIch counter-adverusmg could be m-
troduced mto broadcastmg on any substantIal scale WIthout deterIoratlng 
the quality of broadcast programmmg and news reportmg. Complex, 
detailed, and lengthy calculatlons are necessary to demonstrate the full 
extent to whIch thIs would occur, and the precISe figures will change 
from year to year. However, certam general reiatlonships whIch are 
farrly constant demonstrate the lffipact that would result. FCC data dis-
close that m teleVISIOn network operatIOn, expenses exhaust about 95 
percent of total revenue, and programmmg costs constltute about 90 
percent of all expenses.16 Takmg teleVISIon networks and statIOns to-
gether, expenses are over 80 percent of all revenues, and program costs 
-account for about 70 percent of all expenses. The radio networks have 
been operatmg at a loss for a number of years, WIth expenses exceeding 
revenues and program expenses amountmg to over 60 percent of all ex-
penses .. For radio networks and statIons combmed, total expenses amount 
.16. These data were computed from the F.C.C. Report for the Fiscal Year 1971, supra 
note 15. 
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to about 90 percent of revenue, and program expenses account for about 
33 percent of all expenses. 
Assummg that commercIal broadcastIng could survIve the substantial 
acl9itlOnai cost as well as the loss of revenue Imposed by counter-adver-
tIsmg, It IS obVlous that a substantIal- reductlon of some expenses would 
be necessItated. The only Item wruch offers trus possibility IS program-
mmg, partlcularly m the area of news and public affarrs, where costs are 
especIally disproportIonate to the tlme mvolved. A reductlon of expend-
Itures for programmmg and news would reduce the quality; the relatlon-
srup IS as sImple and mexorable as anythlng m thIS complex field. It fol-
lows that the mtroductlon of counter-advertlsmg mto broadcastIng 
would mevitably result m a permanent deterIoratlon of programmmg 
and-news reportmg and hasten the deIllise of commercIal broadcaStlng. 
4. Counter-Adverttsmg Is Unreasonably Dzscrzmmatory Agaznst 
BroadcaSting 
-It IS noteworthy that proponents of counter-advertIsmg have not sug-
gested that It be applied to any of the prmt media, billboards, mail, or 
other forms of advertIsmg. The proposalliIllltlilg counter-advertIsmg to 
the broadcast media IS wholly adventItious and IS made because broad-
CastIng IS subject to government licensmg and therefore can be sub-
Jected to forms of political m:fiuence and control that cannot be exerted 
agamst other media. As a matter of SImple lOgiC, if certam types of ad-
vertIsmg; or advertISmg for partlcular products, present social problems 
requrrmg legal remedies beyond the power of the FTC, then surely 
action IS requrred WIth respect to all advertIsmg media. However, there 
has not been the slightest hmt" of a belief by the FTC that It, or any 
other government agency, has the power to reqUIre nonbroadcast media 
to carry counter-advertIsmg; nor IS- there any mdicatIon that the FTC 
mtends to ask Congress for such authonty, despIte the fact that substan-
tlal enlarg~ment of Its authorIty IS currendy m the legislative mill.17 
Moreover, there has been no suggestion that the counter-advertIsmg 
proposal should be applied to the one advertlsmg medium over wruch the 
government-clearly has a nght of control. Much of the most obJection-
able -advertlsmg IS delivered by the Postal ServIce. Indeed, Congress has 
found It necessary to enact legislation permIttmg persons to "turn off" 
delivery -p£ particular types of mail advertISmg (although the process IS 
more complicated than changmg televlSlon channels) If free counter-
---
17. See N.Y. Times, July 11, 1973, at-70, col. 2. 
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adverusmg IS a sound proposal for broadcastmg, the same lOgIC would 
support a reqUlrement of free delivery of counter-advertIsmg through 
the mails. It IS clear, however, that such a measure would be as eco-
nomIcally mfeasible as IS the proposal for counter-advertIsmg m the 
broadcast media. 
The Uruted States Supreme Court m 1936 held that a tax on adverus-
mg m newspapers IS prohibIted by the first amendment because It IS 
discrImmatory and mIght result m destroymg both newspaper adver-
usmg and newspapers.IS The counter-advertIsmg proposal of the FTC 
IS no less oppressIve, no less threaterung, and no less discrImmatory 
than the tax held unconstItutIOnal m that case. If counter-advertIsmg IS 
mdeed a socIally desIrable prInCIple, It should be embodied m a legIslatIve 
proposal applicable to all advertIsmg media, mcluding the mails. In Its 
present form, the proposal IS IrratIonally and mdefensibly discrImmatory 
agamst broadcastIng. 
5 Counter-AdvertiSIng Would Not Be In[ormatwe and Would Result 
tn Dtatribe Rather than Dzalogue 
One of the difficultIes wIth many reform proposals IS theIr presentatIon 
m terms of a contrast between the VIces of an actual SItuatIon and the 
flawless dream of an hypothetIcal SItuatIOn, between the ImperfectIOns 
of reality and the perfectIon of an Ideal. Advocates have mtlmated that 
counter-advertIsmg will merely prOVIde tIme for ImpartIal and public 
splflted SCIentIsts to gIve ObjectIve and factual little talks on the undis-
closed ecologIcal and health dangers of advertIsed products. However, 
experIence to date WIth demands for reply tIme to advertIsmg under the 
Farrness Doctrme demonstrates that while ImpartIal SCIentIsts are oc-
cupIed m theIr laboratones, those who most frequently demand free 
broadcastIng tIme to answer advertIsements are, at best, bIased zealots 
and, at worst, publiCIty seekers or crackpots. 
A recent complamt to the FCC mvolvmg dog food commerCIals 
charged that such advertIsmg mIsleads the public mto thmkmg that the 
dog IS man's best fnend WIthout warmng of the danger of ammal-borne 
diseases. Another complamt demanded tIme to reply to a Umted Fund 
appeal m order to urge people not to contribute on the ground that an 
mad equate share of the proceeds went to blacks. Other complamants are 
vegetarIans and astrology advocates who claIm unfarrness toward theIr 
VIews. 
18. GrOSjean v. AmerIcan Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
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., It IS eVIdent that the mdiVlduals most likely to demand counter-ad-
vertISmg tune would not be the well mformed, but the extreIIDsts, the 
fanatics, -and the purveyors of odd brands of sOClal,'snake oil cures. 
Counter-advertisIng Instituted as a regular part of broadcastIng would 
reqUITe an Immense amount of labor on the part of those WIShIng to 
make known theIr VIews. Who IS likely to dedicate hImself to such an 
effort? Is It the SCIentist workIng on some project of hIs own? Is It 
.the busy doctor or the mformed professIOnal dietItIan or engmeer? Or 
IS It the college student who IS bored by hIS. studies and resentful of the 
establishment, the self-appoInted prophet who marches the streets bear-
Ing a SIgn warnmg of some Impending doom, or the aspIrIng politiCIan 
lookIng for publicIty;l Professors may advocate the prmciple of counter-
advertISIng, but fanatics will exerCISe the nght. 
Both common sense and expenence mdicate that if counter-advertisIng 
tune were provIded, It would soon be 'filled 'more With diatribe and' de-
nunCIatIon than WIth factual disclosures or ratIonal disCUSSIOn. It IS al7 
together illusory to believe that counter-advertisIng would really be In-
formatIve. 
6. The Counter-Advertmng Proposal Is Based on the False Pre1111.se that 
the Consumer Does Not Have Dwerse Informatton Sources 
Today's consumers have a plethora of sources from whIch they may 
obtam mformaoon concermng advertiSIng clrums. Statements hIghly 
cnocal of advertISed products are WIdely carned m all media, mcluding 
broadcastIng. Conferences devoted to denunCIatIOn of broadcaStlI1g, the 
media, or advertIsmg are WIdely reported, even m the media bemg de-
nounced. The most bItter cntICIsms of broadcastIng and advertlSmg are 
·the most frequendy broadcast, apparent:ly on the theory that they are 
newsworthy The defects of advertlSed products are reported m news 
stones and commentarIes m broadcastIng and the press. Entrre publica-
nons are devoted to giVIng consumers objective adVIce on the ments of 
advertISed products. "Action line" newspaper columns and radio pro-
grams not only help mdivIdual consumers but adVIse others of com-
plaInts. 
It IS true that advertIsmg messages outnumber counter-advertIsmg 
messages, but there IS no eVIdence that they are as mfluentIal. Although 
there are no reliable data on the comparatIve potency of advertiSIng, 
,counter-advertising, and news, there have been demonstratIons that news 
reports are far more mfluenci.al than advertIsmg. A "scare story" about a 
product may be enough to dnve It off the market despIte advertlSmg. 
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On the other hand, an mcrease m counter-adverttsmg m all Its forms 
would not necessarily mcrease Its effectIveness. Counter-adverttsmg may 
even defeat Its own purpose by proliferatmg warnmgs agamst adverttsed 
products to the pomt that the credibility of leglOmate warnrngs IS re-
duced. It IS reported that thIS has happened m the case of hexachloro-
phene,19 and apparently It has occurred wIth cIgarettes.20 Certamly no 
one can claIm that the public IS not mformed and warned about the 
dangers of c1garettes, smce every package and advertIsement carrIes ItS 
own counter-advertISement. 
Similarly, news about many other products and problems IS common 
m the media. The public 1S contmually remmded of the problem of aIr 
pollutIon and of the contributI'On made to arr pollutIon by automobiles. 
The vrrtues and VIces of VarIOUS foods and dietary supplements are mat-
ters of daily media comment. 
Furthermore, advertlsmg Itself now performs many 'Of the functIons 
attributed to counter-advernsmg. Generally, adverttsmg IS hIghly com-
petltIve; It IS the essence of competttIve advertlsmg to urge the superIorI-
ty of one product over another. ThIS IS not mfrequently done by pre-
sentIng comparatIve data wIth respect to SIze, performance, 'Or other 
qualitles, and frequently comparIsons between competItlve brand prod-
ucts are made. Moreover, the law reqUlres some categorIes of products, 
such as drugs, to carry labels contammg speCIfied mformatlOn, and 
many labels are begmnmg to read like mmlature treatIses. 
These cons1deratlons evoke SuspICIOn that advocates of counter-ad-
vernsmg hope It will perform the role of unselling, rather than mform-
mg. In any event, the available sources of mformatlon concernmg 
advertIsed products are so numerous and diverse that the difficulty con-
frontmg the average consumer IS m copmg WIth the mass of available 
data, n'Ot m securmg more. 
7 Counter-Advertzsmg Would Dzmzmsh the Amount of Useful In-
formation Available to the Consumer 
There are three limmng factors whIch determme the amount of mfor-
matlon anyone can use: the sources, the channels, and the attentIon 
span of the mmd. There are more diverse sources of mformatlon about 
consumer products than any consumer can now study attentlvely To 
the degree that broadcastIng serves as a channel of such mformatIon, the 
19. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 4. 
20. Id., Nov. 29, 1972, at 44, col. 1. 
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tune and resources available to present obJectlve news and lffipartIal 
commentary will mevitably be curtailed if broadcastmg IS requrred to 
carry any substantlal amount of counter-advertlSmg. Perhaps more Im-
portant, the tolerance of any mdividual for attending to discurSIve ex-
patlatlon on the ments or dements of consumer products IS qUIte limIted. 
Advertlsers know that doubling the amount of advemsmg does not 
double ItS Impact. Substltutmg a substantlal amount of counter-adver-
tlsmg for eIther programmmg or advertlsmg IS far more likely to rrn-
tate than to mform the audience.21 The result is likely to be that the 
average consumer IS less, rather than more, mformed. 
The effect will be even greater on advertlSmg Itself. Although all 
advertIsmg will be Withm the target area for counter-advemsmg, the 
target's bulls-eye will be factual advertlSmg, a pomt the FTC has already 
made clear m Its attacks. So long as advertlSmg IS confined to Identify-
mg a product and brand name, or even to suggestmg that the consumer 
will like Brand X, there IS little to counter. However, as soon as ad-
vertIsmg makes tmy assertIon of fact, It opens the door to dispute and 
attack. To be subject to counter-advertIsmg, factual claImS need not 
be false or mIsleading; if they are, they lie Wlthm the present scope 
of FTC power. It IS advertISements not subject to actIon on the ground 
of bemg false or mIsleading whIch are the targets of counter-advertlSmg. 
In short, a mam purpose of the counter-advertIsmg proposal IS to pro-
VIde a method of disputmg factual claImS whIch cannot be disproved. 
To observe the effect of thIS approach, conSIder the types of adver-
tlsmg whIch mIght be used to market a soft drInk: 
Dnnk Burpo! 
Burpo tastes good. 
Burpo makes you feel good. 
Burpo has vltamm C. 
Burpo has lots of vltamm C. 
Burpo wIth vltarmn C IS good for you. 
It IS clear that those advertIsements contammg the most factual mforma-
tlon are most vulnerable to attack by counter-advertlsfug. Because thIS 
conclUSIon IS already known to advertIsers,22 the net effect of counter-
21. The most common complamt concernmg televlSlon commercIals IS that they are 
too frequent and too long. ROBERT T. BOWER, TELEVISION AND THE PtmLIC 84 (1973). 
See also ADVERTISING AGE, June 25, 1973, at 10; ROPER ORGANIZATION, WHAT PEoPLE 
THINK OF TELEVISION AND OTHER MASS MEDIA, 1959-1972 (1973). 
22. The Washmgton Star-News, Feb. 28, 1973, at A-24. ThIS report quotes the Rev. 
Robert McEwen, professor of econOmICS at Boston College and president of the 
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adverusmg, assummg that broadcastmg and broadcast advertIsmg survIve 
Its unplementatlon, would surely be to diImrush, rather than to mcrease, 
the amount of mformatIon now available to the average consumer. 
8. Counter-Advettismg Is Unfatt to Honest Advertisers 
Whatever case may be made for permIttmg counter-advertIsmg m 
specIfic cases wIth reference to parucular claIms and products, It IS dif-
ficult to construct any ratlonal argument for requIrmg counter-advertls-
mg penods devoted to attack 'On any or all advert1Smg Virtually all 
product commerCIals are directed to promotmg product brands rather 
than to discussmg general ISSUes, and advertIsers are mhibIted by knowl-
edge that they cannot mIsrepresent or mIslead. Counter-advertlsmg ad-
vocates, on the other hand, are urunhibIted by any constnctmg prm-
cIples, and theIr statements already on file wIth the FCC demonstrate 
that they are prepared t'O attack all product advertIsmg on such extreme 
grounds as the claun that consumers should spend less money for com-
merCIal products because the mdustrIal establishment of the country IS 
already too large and thus mdustrIal produCtIon should be reduced. In 
the face of such attacks, adverusers would be confronted wIth the equally 
undesIrable alternatIves of eIther conunumg to concentrate on the pro-
motlon of theIr brands, leavmg the attacks unanswered, or of attemptIng, 
at substantlally mcreased cost, both to promote theIr brands and defend 
theIr SOCIal posmon. 
Although the desIrability of decreasmg the GNP may be a legmmate 
subject of public debate, there IS no reason why the cost should be borne 
by, and the attack directed at, those advertIsers who are unfortunate 
enough to use broadcast commercIals. Counter-adverusmg would be a 
kmd of public pillorymg of all broadcast advertIsers, wIthout any 
charges, mqurry, hearmg, eVIdence, or finding of fault or guilt. Such a 
system IS contrary to the most elementary requIrements of due process 
and farr procedure and IS symptomatIc of an Impatience WIth due process 
of law and an mSIstence on mstant remedies wIthout regard to legal 
prmcIples. 
For those wIth a knowledge of hIstory, counter-advertIsmg IS SImply 
a sophIstIcated modern method of licensmg buccaneers. Once the li-
censmg IS established, the finanCIal demands, the payoffs, and the black-
mail will begm. ThIS pattern has already resulted wIth respect to threat-
ened challenges to broadcast license renewals. To extend thIS system to 
Massachusetts ASSOCIatIOn of Consumers, as saymg that "nothmg ads" are a direct 
result of FTC efforts to Impose more rIgorous standards on advertlsmg. 
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all broadcast advertISers IS to InVIte a massIve new corruption of Amen-
can commercial life and to fasten a perrucious plague upon honest ad-
vertISers. 
9 Counter-Adverttsmg Would Create Bars to Innovatton, ImJ!rove-
ment, and Entry of New Products tnto the Market 
It IS partlcularly rromc that counter-advertlsmg should be proposed 
by the FTC. One of the functIOns of that agency, 1fl addiu0R to po-
licmg advertlsmg, IS to enforce the antitrust laws. An unportant aspect 
of such enforcement IS preventIng the erection of econOffilC bars to 
market entry Probably the most effective method of mtroducmg a 
new or unproved product mto the consumer market IS by advertiSmg. 
There may, mdeed, be no other effective way However, It IS the claIm 
of novelty, mnovatlon, or unprovement wruch IS most likely to draw 
the fire of the antl-advertlsmg bngade. 
ThIS phenomenon has been demonstrated m the field of ecology Al-
though some products have been unproved so that they pollute less or 
aId m dirnnushmg pollutlon, advertlsmg clauns of such developments 
seem to be partlcularly mCItlng to the self-appomted guardians of the 
envrronment.23 Moreover, the FTC has mdicated that such clauns are 
mherently controversial and subject to rebuttal attack regardless of therr 
truth or validity 24 
23. See, e.g., Alan F NeckrItz, 29 F.C.C.2d 807 (1971), 37 F.C.C.2d 528 (1972) TIns 
case Involved the claun of Standard Oil Co. of Califorma that Its patented gasoline 
additIve Chevron F-310 reduces unburned hydrocarbons and carbon monmade In auto-
mobile exhaust emIssIons by SIgnificant and determmable amounts. On appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for the DistrIct of ColumbIa CirCUIt, complamants, together WIth a 
host of amICI CUriae, contended that regardless of the truth of the advernsIng clauns 
such advertIsements should be subjected to counter-advernsIng under the FaIrness Doc-
trIne. ThIS author appeared as counsel for the advertIser, Standard Oil Co. of Cali-
forma. ComplaInants' demands were rejected by the FCC. As of the date thIS 
ArtIcle was prepared for publicatIon, the case was still pending before the Court of 
Appeals. 
24. The Statement of the Federal Trade CommISSIon before the FCC In F.C.C. Docket 
No. 19260, part ill, noted In pemnent part: 
Many advemsers have responded to the public's grOWIng concern WIth 
envrronmental decay by claImIng that therr products contribute to the solu-
tIon of ecolOgIcal problems, or that therr compames are makIng specIal ef-
forts to Improve the envrromnent generally. Similar efforts appear WIth 
respect to the public's concern WIth nutrItIon, automobile safety, and a 
host of other controversIal ISSUes of current public Importance. While 
other approaches could, of course, be deVISed, the most effectIve means of 
assurIng full public awareness of OppOSIng POInts of vIew WIth regard to 
such Issues, and to assure that OppOSIng VIews have a SIgnificant chance to 
persuade the public, IS counter-advertISIng. 
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There cannot be any serIOUS doubt that It IS desrrable for products to 
be made and sold whIch ameliorate or contribute to the solutIon of en-
vrronmental polluuon problems. ThIs can and will be done only if 
there IS some practIcal way to gam entry mto the market for such 
products. New or Improved products that meet a public need are tra-
diuonally mtroduced mto mass markets by advertlSlng. There IS no 
equally effecuve alternauve. AdvertIsmg that IS subJect to government 
licensed and sponsored attacks IS certamly less effective and less at-
tractIve than advertIsmg wruch IS SImply requrred to be truthful and 
accurate. Consequently, It IS certam that whatever other effect It may 
have, counter-adverusmg would act as another bar to the entry of new 
products mto the market. Such a result not only would operate to m-
crease market concentratIOn and decrease competIt1on but also would 
tend to discourage the development of new and Improved products, par-
tIcularly those whIch are ecolOgIcally benefiCIal. 
10. The Purpose and Effect ot the Counter-Advertmng Proposal Is To 
Increase Government Power 
A faVOrIte tOpIC of government offiCIals IS the evil of mcreasmg con-
centratIon of economIC power. There IS no real dispute that the con-
centrauon of economIC power IS undesrrable; the debate concerns 
whether the eVIdence demonstrates an mcreased concentratIon of power 
m the prIvate sector. Usually neglected m such diSCUSSIOns IS that con-
centratIOn of power m public msututIons has about the same SOCIal con-
sequences as undue concentratIon m the pnvate sector, and that eco-
nOmIC and SOCIal power has undoubtedly become mcreasmgly concen-
trated m government m recent years. 
The tendency to seek power IS natural. Government offiCIals are not 
disembodied spmts mhabIt1ng an ethereal realm where they seek only 
some holy grail called "the public mterest." Government offiCIals are 
flesh and blood people who are motIvated by Impulses common to all 
human bemgs. Probably the maJorIty of mdivIduals employed m and out 
of government are motIvated prImarily by the desrre for monetary re-
wards. However, for most policymakmg offiCIals, m and out of govern-
ment, the remunerative factor IS less 1ffiportant than conSIderatIons of 
personal prestIge and satIsfactIon. 
Top executIves m prIvate enterprIse seek money, or profit, at least m 
sIgrnficant part as a measure and symbol of success. AchIevement of thIS 
obJecuve usually mvolves expanding sales or operatIons so that more 
busmess IS transacted and more profit earned. In government the sItua-
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uon IS snnilar, except that the money secured by expanding operauons 
IS called "appropnauons" mstead of '~profits", greater presuge and satlS~ 
facuon, as well as.the success of mcreased appropnauons, IS secured by 
mcreasmg the scope of agency operauons through the expanSIOn of 
'JurISdicuon or power. As a general rule, busmessmen seek mcreased 
profits and government offiCIals seek mcreased power. Busmessmen do 
not always seek to mcrease therr profit at whatever cost, and government 
offiCIals do not always seek mcreased power. Nevertheless, more often 
than not, the profit mouve will be explanatory of busmess aCUon and the 
power mouve of government acuon.25 The power moUve IS to govern ... 
ment what the profit motive 15 to busmess. 
The consIStent operauon of the power mOUve can be verified by 
anyone reading the newspapers. An example, if any, 'Of a government 
agency askIng for dimmlshed JurlSdicuon or less appropnauons would 
be extremely rare and relauvely msignificant. On the other hand, any 
week's news dispatches from Washmgton will carry numerous accounts 
'Of government agenCIes lillpOrtunmg Congress for more power and 
more money to exerCIse the mcreased power. The charrman of the FTC 
recently testified that the needs of that Comrrussion cannot be apprecI-
ated properly by the Office of Management and Budget and that the 
FTC therefore should have the nght to submIt Its budget request di-
rectly to Congress, obVIously so that It will be able to ask and get 
bIgger appropnauons.26 
At first glance the FTC proposal that the FCC reqUIre counter-ad-
verusmg would seem to be mconslStent WIth operatIOn of the power 
motive. It appears to be a suggesuon from one agency that another 
agency's JurIsdictIon should be expanded. However, the appearance IS 
illusory If the FCC adopts the FTC proposal, the FTC will thereby 
demonstrate ItS own mfluence. Furthermore, It IS clear that counter-ad-
vertIsmg would attract every publiCIty seeker, eccentrIC, and a substan-
tIal poruon of the lunatIc frmge, and would mVIte statements and clauns 
more false and decepuve than anythmg appearmg m commercIal adver-
tlSmg. In recogmtIOn of these.possibiliues, the FTC has stated that some 
25. See Loevmger, The SOCIology of Bureaucracy, 24 Bus. LAWYER 7 (1968). Cf, 
ROBERT N. KHARAsCH, THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE (1973), where It IS contended 
that government agenCIes and other bureaucratIc mstItutIons are motIvated mamly by 
the purpose of mamtammg therr own eXIStence. While there are some differences m 
tmplicatIon between the power hypOthesIS and the InstItutIOnal survtval hypOthesIS as 
explanatory of government actIon, they have substantIally the same SIgnificance for the 
.analySIS presented m thiS Arttcle. 
26. BNA ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 551, at A-17 (Feb. 22, 1971) 
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form of regulatIOn or restramt of counter-advertlSlng may be necessary, 
lffiplicIdy suggestmg Its availability 
AuthorIty to supervISe counter-adVertISlOg claims would expand FTC 
power Just at a tIme when that agency IS 10SlOg some of ItS JurISdictIon 
m other areas. The new product safety commISSIOn, for example, IS 
talang over a sIgmficant segment of the consumer protectIon field form-
erly held exclUSIvely by the FTC, and the proposed consumer agency 
threatens to displace the FTC as the pnncIpal consumer spokesman m 
the federal government. Thus, like an mdustrIalist WIth a product that 
has become obsolete, the FTC must diversify mto new fields m order to 
malOtam Its pOSItIOn. 
The counter-adVertISlOg proposal IS only part of the FTC effort to 
expand and diversify That agency IS also seekmg to develop ItS own 
"faIrness doctrme." In Pfizer, Inc.27 the FTC declared that It would 
henceforth Judge advertIslOg not merely by whether It was false or de-
ceptIve but also by whether It was "faIr" to the consumer. FaIrness,. III 
tills sense, means that an advertIser must gIVe the consumer whatever 
mformatIon the FTC regards as relevant and Important. Thus, the FTC 
IS movmg from the functIon of preventmg false, mIsleading, or decep-
tIve advertlSmg to the role of establishIng standards based upon ItS con-
cept of what IS best for the consumer. 
In ItS search for Increased power, the FTC has both responded to and 
encouraged the general hostility to and distrust of bUSIness whIch has 
developed In the public m recent years. Like many government agen-
CIes, the FTC has accepted uncntIcally the Idea that there must be a 
politIcal remedy for every problem. Such a premIse leads to the assump-
tIon that there should be a legal remedy for every complaint. The dif-
ficulty, of course, IS that complaInts are easy to VOIce, vary WIdely, and 
are often mconsIstent, while legal remedies are difficult to formulate, 
relatIvely slow m operatIon, and usually less effectIve than expected, or 
even qUIte unforeseeable m effect. Furthermore, complaInts are not 
satISfied, even by effectIve remedies, but tend to proliferate and escalate 
endlessly, while the power of law IS limIted. As a result, smce It IS literal-
ly Impossible to deVIse legal remedies for all complamts, complamers con-
tmually demand more than legal authOrItIes can possibly produce. 
Nevertheless, by stImulatIng, encouragIng, and responding to com-
plamts, a government agency can create an actIve constItuency support-
mg and encouragIng Its claIms to power. ThIS IS what the FTC has done 
27. F.T.C. Docket No. 8819 (July 11, 1972), BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 
572, at D-l (July 18, 1972). 
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m the past and appears to be the prmcipal motIvatIng force behmd the 
counter-advertIsmg proposal. In any event, the FTC has pleased Its 
constItuents. 
If the proposal were adopted, the FCC would soon find Itself m an 
area completely alien to It and one for whIch It lacks staff, experIence, 
and apprOprIatIOns. If the FCC were rash enough to reach for the FTC 
counter-advertIsmg chestnuts, It would thus have to turn to the FTC for 
help m aVOIding the fire. The mevitable result would be a vast expansIOn 
of the JUrIsdictlon of the FTC wIthout any actIon by Congress or the 
courts and wIthout a scmtilla of statutory authorIty In effect, the FTC 
would have borrowed authorIty from the FCC to mcrease ItS own 
power. In the annals of government power-seekmg, thIs would rank as 
a great coup d'etat. 
11. Counter-Advertzszng Would Increase the Power of Small Militant 
Groups 
Behmd every powerful government agency there stand mterested 
socIal or econOmIC groups. For years It has been charged that speCIalized 
regulatory agencIes were unduly responsIve to the mdustry group they 
regulated. AgencIes like the FTC, however, have until recently lacked 
the support of cohesIve pressure groups. With the me of militant and 
aCtlVlSt consumer movements, the FTC suddenly has found Itself a pres-
sure group. It has attempted to cement ItS developmg alliance by bemg 
hIghly responsIve to ItS constItuency's demands for new remedies. 
The counter-advertIsmg proposalts one such response. Although the 
FCC had held a WIde-open mqmry on the applicatIon of Its FaIrness 
Doctrme to commerCIals, and although the most actIVIst and artIculate 
consumer advocates had commented m that hearmg, no one had yet sug-
gested as radical and far-reachmg a proposal as the FTC counter-adver-
tlSmg scheme. The reactIon from the antI-advertIsmg gang was sImilar 
to what would be expected from the oil mdustry if the Internal Revenue 
SerVIce proposed mcreasmg the oil depletIon allowance to 50 percent. 
If the FTC proposal were adopted, there would be lffiffiediate need 
for the productIOn and presentatIon of a vast number of counter-com:.. 
merciais. These would certamly not come from advertIsers 'Or theIr 
agenCIes. The only plausible source would be the aCtIVlSt groups now 
supportmg the FTC proposal. Such groups would thus be m the same 
posmon that a busmess enterprISe would occupy if It were given a gift 
of 10 or 20 percent of all broadcast commerCIal time. The Ideas of thIs 
22 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15 1 
little group would suddenly assume l1llmense l1llp0rtance, and Its m-
fluence would be greater than that of any busmess or advertISer. The 
group would assume seIDl-officIal statTls, smce the FTC and FCC 
would, of neceSSIty, have to deal wIth ItS self-proclaImed leaders. ThIs 
scenano IS not mentioned m the FTC statement; however, thIS IS the 
way reality works. 
Although these small, aCtiVIst, militant groups would obtam a large 
measure of political and economIC power, there would be no assurance 
that theIr obJectives at all comcided WIth the mterests of the mass of 
consumers. No mecharusm has been suggested or devIsed to test, much 
less msure, such representatIOn. In fact, the agencIes have expressed little 
concern about thIS questIOn, as verbal volume seems to be more Im-
portant than supporting numbers. Nevertheless, It IS qUite clear that the 
Opposltlon to such groups IS substantial. The head of a federal agency 
was applauded by hundreds of women leaders when she told them that 
televISIOn's "inordinate amount of time gIven to dissenters, protesters, 
and ne'er-do-well radicals IS mcomprehensible-and dangerous." 28 ThIS 
and other mdicatIons suggest that It IS Imprudent and unwarranted to 
take a step that can result only m gIvmg much additIOnal power and 
media exposure to a small, vocal, but unrepresentatIve group.29 
12. Counter-Adverttsmg Would Meet No Real Need and Solve No 
Important Problem 
It IS banal to say that we are confronted With many Important and 
senous problems today The FCC requIres broadcasters to survey the 
needs and mterests of theIr commurutIes, and, m effect, to ascertam and 
respond to commuruty problems. As Senator Hartke has noted, the files 
of the FCC prOVIde a nch mme of SOCIal mformatIon.3o Perusal of these 
and other sources reveals many problems about whICh people are con-
cerned, but advertIsmg IS practically never mentioned. War, CrIme, 
housmg, raCIsm, mflatIon, the economy and unemployment, drugs, taxes, 
28. WashIngton Star-News, Dec. 7, 1972, at B-2; WashIngton Post, Dec. 7, 1972, 
at L-l, col. 1-6. 
29. As JustIce Douglas has SaId In an analogous case: "In 1973-as In other years-
there IS clamorIng to make the TV and radio emit the messages that console certain 
groups." Columbia BroadcastIng System v. Democratic Nat'l COmmIttee, 93 S. Ct. 
20BO, 2112 (1973) (concurring opInIOn). The opinIOn of the Court In that case states 
that the Court cannot accept the "view that every potential speaker IS 'the best Judge' 
of what the listerung public ought to hear or Indeed the best Judge of hIS or her 
Views. All Journalistic tradition and experIence IS to the contrary" ld. at 2097 
30. 139 CONGo REc.14,362 (daily ed. Sept. 8,1972). 
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malfeasance m government, and sunilar matters are the problems wInch 
.concern people. AdvertIsmg IS at most a penpheral and at least a syn-
thetic problem. 
No doubt there are advertIsmg Qbuses. There always have been, and 
probably always will be, abuses of every freedom. There contInue to 
be false, ITIlsleading, and deceptive advertIsements, although these are 
clearly fewer m proportion to the total amount of advertlSmg than has 
been the case m the past. The FTC has ample power to deal WIth such 
abuses; morever, broadcast mdustry agenCIes are assummg an mcreasmg-
ly sIgmficant role m detectIng and preventIng abuses. 
Indeed, the'FTC has stated that wherever product safety IS mvolved, 
"scrupulous accuracy m advertlSmg clanns" 31 IS requrred, and that "it 
lS unlawful not to affirmatIvely reveal any liITI1tatIons wInch may m fact 
eXist" 32 or to fail to disclose the limIts of safety clanns. The FTC also 
mSIsts that "advertisers are held to a hIgh standard of care m makIng 
I~presentatIons mvolvmg the safety of therr products m order to assure 
to the greatest extent possible that therr clanns will not be ITIlsunderstood 
by the public." 33 In light 'Of these standards, It cannot be contended that 
counter-advertlSmg IS necessary WIth respect to the safety of advertIsed 
products. Even beyond matters of safety, the FTC has stretched the 
liITI1ts of reasonableness m reading Implied clauns mto advertlSmg and 
requrrmg disclosures or disclanners wherever there IS any possibility that 
advertIsmg clauns may ITIlslead. Thus, It cannot be asserted that counter-
advertlSmg IS requrred to remedy any abuses mvolvmg falSIty, ITIlsrepre-
sentatIon, or deception of any kInd. 
The rromc fact seems to be that advertlSmg today IS not at all men-
acmg but IS sunply annoymg. The _current complamts about advertIsmg 
are that so much of It IS rrntatIng and bormg. These qualities have been 
exacerbated by the hIghly VIsible and mtruSIve nature of teleVISIon ad-
vertIsmg, and counter-advertIsmg would sunply make matters worse. 
Counter-commercIals would surely be less profesSIOnal and more poleITIlc 
and pedestnan than commerCIals. They would certaInly be as bormg as 
commercIals, and, by adding to the volume of gabble and clutter, they 
would make broadcast advertIsmg even more rrntatIng to the public. 
Although there IS a certam amount of advertlSmg whIch almost all of 
us find distasteful, thIS IS not a SOCIal problem. The pnce we pay for 
free speech IS toleration 'Of distasteful and abUSIve expreSSIOn. If we 
31. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 8818 (Sept. 22, 1972). 
-32.ld. 
33.ld. 
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permlt only that speech whIch we find tasteful and agreeable, there IS no 
free speech. Freedom eXists only when we permIt that whIch we dislike 
and disapprove. Similarly, the pnce we pay for a free economy IS tolera-
tIon of distasteful expressIOn and excesses. An economy IS not free when 
standards of taste and acceptability are prescribed by the state and devIa-
tIons are subject to sanctIOns. There must, of course, be ultImate limIts 
of socIal tolerance set by law AdvertIsIng whIch IS false,. mIsleading, Of 
deceptIve IS, and should be, prohibIted and pumshed. Withm these limItS, 
however, a free economy cannot afford the ImpOSltlOn of officIal stand-
ards of propnety or acceptability 
Counter-advertISIng IS an attempt to do Just that. It IS an effort to' 
meet- the loud vocal demands of a small group whIch has become the 
FTC constituency, even at the cost of mtroducmg new economIC Im-
pediments to entry and Innovatlon and other rIgIdities and distortIOns-
mto the marketIng process. It IS not a response to any crymg abuse, need,. 
or problem, and It IS not discernibly related to any Important socIal need 
or problem. 
13. Counter-Adverttstng Would Create a Host of New Problems, In-
cluding Possible Governmental Interference wtth the First Amend-
ment Rtght to Free Speech 
Although counter-advertIsIng would not solve any problems, It would 
certaInly create some real ones.34 Most sIgruficantly, any attempt by the 
government to determIne wmch spokesmen and whIch vIewpomts should 
be heard dunng tlme devoted to counter-advertisIng would result III the 
government's settIng the agenda for the Issues to be heard by the public, a 
SItuatIOn hardly conSIstent WIth the freedom 'Of speech contemplated by 
the first amendment. Furthermore, although the FTC suggests the POSSI-
bility of limItatlons and prohibltlons on the content of counter-advertls-
mg, there does not appear to be any legal baSIS for the exerClse of such a. 
power. The FTC has no JunsdictIOn to control any expressIOn of VIews 
concermng products by persons not engaged m trade In such products.3s 
As mdicated by cases whIch have already come before the FCC, It 
appears certam that the counter-commercIal spokesmen will make state-
34. The Supreme Court has noted that the attempt to provIde free broadcastmg tune 
to those unable to afford commercIal time would raIse "incredible admmIStratIVe prob-
lems." Columb13 Broadcastmg System v. Democratic Nat'l CommIttee, 93 S. Ct. 
2080,1097 n.17 (1973) 
35. Globe Cardboard Novelty Co. v. FTC, 192 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1951); ScIentific 
Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941) 
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ments wIuch advertISers will regard as false, deceptive, and unfarr. Will 
-the advertISers then be entitled to reply tlme under the Farrness Doc-
tnne, or will advertISers be reqUIred to purchase additional commercIal 
-tlme to reply to attacks on counter-commercIal tlme? In eIther event, 
-advertISers will be put to the burden and expense of defending them-
.selves agamst charges wIuch are, m effect, sponsored by the government, 
-even though no government agency will have mvestIgated them 'Or de-
termmed that they should be brought. An even more troublesome pos-
.sibility IS that not only will advertISers not be gIven free reply tlme, 
they may be unable to purchase commercIal tlme because the broad-
-caster may have reached Ius commerclallimtt WIth the added 'burden of 
,counter-commercIals or may be unwilling to mcur the added nsk of 
further reJomders if he perIIDts an advertISmg response to counter-ad-
vertISIng attacks. Under such CIrcumstances, advertIsers would be at 
-the mercy of the most Irresponsible and extreIIDst factions or mdivlduals. 
There IS also the probability, vergmg on certamty, that counter-adver-
:tlSmg VOICes would raIse innumerable controversIal political and socIal 
.ISsues, as they have already done. These ISSUes mclude such modest pro-
'posals as limttIng pnvate expenditures, mcreasmg taxation and govern-
ment expenditures on public projects generally, prohibItIng pnvate auto-
mobiles and mternal combustion engmes, mcreasmg our reliance on 
.atoIIDC power, prohibltmg further construction of atoIIDc power plants, 
'prohibItIng such products as personal deodorants, and prohibItIng the 
.sale of any drugs over the counter or the broadcast advertIsmg of any 
.drugs, mcluding aspmn. How a broadcaster could mamtam any balance 
in the face of such contentions, whether he would have to double the 
<counter-advertISmg tlme and prOVIde counter-counter-advertIsmg, and 
whether broadcastmg would become nothmg but a medium for debate 
-between the most diSSIdent groups m SOCIety and theIr opponents are all 
problems squardy presented by the FTC proposal. However, no an-
swers are so much as hmted. 
" The more closely the proposal IS exammed, the more complex the 
questions become, and there IS no mdicatIon that any effort has or will 
be devoted to arnvmg at solutions bef'Ore It IS too late. What are the 
nghts of a producer who believes that the advertIsed clrums of supen-
onty for a product competitive to Ius -are exaggerated or false? Does 
-a seller have the nght to use counter-advertIsmg tlme to correct what 
he regards as the IIDsleading claImS of.a competitor? Orsuppose It-IS 
_discovered _-:that some ardent counter.,.adv~rtlsmg. advocate IS, m fact, 
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subsI<lized, advIsed, or connected' wIth the competItor of an advertISer 
who IS attacked? What mecharusm can prevent such mCIdents, and 
how can they be farrly handled when they occur if counter-adver.tlSmg 
IS mstItutIOnalized? 
These are only a few of the manifold problems that will surely anse 
if the FTC counter-advertlsmg proposal IS Implemented. The result IS 
a scheme wruch neIther solves nor responds to any Important problem 
but wruch would certamly create at least several maJor problems. A 
charItable conclusIOn IS that the proposal was not well consIdered. 
14. Cownter-Advertzsmg Is the Antztheszs of Free Speech 
Counter-advertIsmg IS urged m the name of free speech; mdeed, on 
first ImpressIon It may seem that offermg tIme to speak agamst the 
volume of broadcast commercIals IS an expanSIOn of the nght of free 
speech. More careful exammatIon of the proposal, however, demon-
strates that the free speech claIm IS qUlte speCIOUS and that counter-ad-
vertlSmg IS, by Its very nature, government-mandated and controlled 
speech, not free speech. 
Suppose that the FCC adopted a requrrement for counter-advertIsmg 
and that some public-spmted engmeer demanded orne to assure con-
sumers that Chrysler cars really are engmeered better than others. Can 
one conceIve that he would be heard? Or suppose that a labor leader 
requested tune to urge that consumers should buy domestIc rather than 
unported products-automobiles, textiles, cameras, shoes, whatever-and 
to adVISe people what brands were manufactured by umon labor m thIS 
country Does anyone unagme that such a plea would be gtven counter-
advertlSmg tIme? It IS the OppOSIte vIewpomts-that automobiles are not 
well engmeered or that domestIC products are produced m sweatshop 
conditIons-whIch would surely be welcomed by counter-advertlsmg 
"sponsors." Although counter-adverttsmg advocates mIght WIsh to 
quarrel Wlth thIS formulatIon of acceptable and unacceptable VIews, the 
SIgnificant pomt IS that mherent m the very concept of counter-adver-
tlsmg IS the Idea that certaIn vIewpomts are entItled to a government 
mandate compelling therr broadcast. 
Thus, the demand for counter-advertlsmg tIme IS not a demand for 
free speech at all; rather, It IS a demand that the government sanctIon and 
mandate a partIcular land of speech and the expresSIOn of some speCIal 
viewpomt. The proposal IS wrong m prmclple and daI?-gerous as 
precedent. If the government can mandate the expreSSIOn of a specIfic 
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vIewpomt m the econqnuc realm, It can do so WIth equru: logtc and 
proprIety m the politIcal realm,3s At thIs pomt, all pretense of free 
speech, an open socIety,. and politIcal democracy vamsh, -and the whole 
'scheme becomes apparent for what It Is-an effort to. use the power 
of government to promote the expressIon of a partIcular vtewpomt held 
by a favored artIculate group. Such an effort IS not redeemed by toe 
fact that thIs group marches today under the banner of "·consumerISm." 
Tomorrow the same group, or some other group WIth the. same demand 
for government support of ItS vIewpomt, may march under the banner 
of natIOnal SOCIalism or commumsm, or some other Ideology The pro-
posal that the government mandate the broadcast expressIOn of any 
speCIal vIewpomt, no matter how defined, IS basIcally subverSIve, Incon-
SIStent With, and dangerous to the AmerIcan prmciple of government 
neutrality and protectIon of free speech.37 
It IS no secret that every adffiilllStratIon believes that news reportlng 
and commentary on ItS aCtIVItIes IS unfarr. Since the functIon of the 
36. In ColumbIa Broadcastmg System v. DemocratIc Nat'l CommIttee, 93 S. Ct. 2080 
(1973), It was argued that the FCC was reqUIred to mandate the broadcastmg of par-
tIcular politIcal VIews. The FCC had rejected thIS argument 10 DemocratIc Nat'l Com-
ffilttee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970), and Busmess ExecutIves Move for Vietnam Peace, 25 
F.C.C.2d 242 (1970) However, a maJonty of the Court of Appeals for the Distnct of 
ColumbIa CirCUIt ruled that broadcasters could not refuse editonal advertIsements ex-
pressIng politIcal VIews, as a matter of policy, and that the FCC had the power and the 
duty to deterffilUe whIch editonal advertISements (and therefore whIch politIcal VIews) 
broadcasters were reqUIred to present. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). ThIs deCISIOn was 
reversed by the Supreme Court. 
37. See Columbia BroadcastIng System v. DemocratIc Nat'l Comffilttee, 93 S. Ct. 
2080, 2098-99 (1973), where the Supreme Court observed that a government-mandated 
"rIght of access" to broadcastIng mvolves "the rISk of an enlargement of government 
control over the content of broadcast diSCUSSIOn of public ISSues. " The Court 
contmued: 
Under a constItutIonally commanded and government supervISed right-
of-access system urged by respondents and mandated by the Court of 
Appeals, the [Federal COmmUOlCatIons] CommISSIOn would be reqUIred to 
oversee far more of the day-to-day operatIons of broadcasters' conduct, de-
CIding such questIons as whether a partIcular mdiVIdual or group has had 
suffiCIent opporturuty to present Its VIewpOInt and whether a partIcular 
VIewpomt has already been sufficiendy arred. Regmtentmg broadcasters IS 
too radical a therapy, for the ailments respondents complam of. 
• The COmmISSIOn'S responsibilitIes under a nght-of-access system 
would tend to draw It Into a contmuIng case-by-case deterffilUatIon of who 
should be heard and when. Indeed, the likelihood of Government mvolve-
ment IS so great that It has been suggested that the accepted constItutIonal 
pnnciples agamst control of speech content would need to be relaxed WIth 
respect to editonal advertISements. To sacrifice First Amendment protec-
tIons for a speculatIve gam IS not warranted. 
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media IS to CntlCIZe, rather than to tout, the operatlon of government, 
there may mdeed be some basIS for such VIews. The logIc of counter-
adverosmg would warrant the government m reqmrmg the establish-
ment of a regular pro-admmIstratlOn broadcastmg perIod when only 
spokesmen favorable to the current adIrurustratlon would be allowed to 
speak. LOgIcally thIs would lead to a demand that a specIfic perIod be 
set aSIde for the Opposltlon vIewpomt; very shortly the detenrunatIOn 
of what vIewpomts should be expressed and what spokesmen heard 
would be entIrely a functlon of some government agency It cannot be 
serIously mamtamed that thIS would be free speech or a practIce per-
mIssible under the :first amendment. 
It IS unnecessary to deCIde whether the prmcIple of counter-adver-
tlSmg would be extended beyond the proposal now before the FCC. 
That proposal Itself only masquerades as free speech. Its true essence 
IS the absolute antlthesIS of free speech. Counter-advertIsmg, by Its very 
nature, IS government-mandated and controlled speech, and represents 
the epItome of government control whIch the :first amendment was de-
SIgned to outlaw forever m thIS country m order to preserve truly free 
speech. It must always be remembered that It IS a free press, not a "faIT" 
press, that IS requIred by the ConstItutIOn.3S Freedom m a large and 
diverse country will ultImately produce faIrness, but a government-
balanced "farrness" cannot produce freedom. 
Broadcastmg today carnes much counter-advertISmg materIal. It IS 
the prmcIple of government mandate and control that IS objectIOnable 
m the present proposal. The exerCISe of government power to establish 
perIods for the broadcast expreSSIOn of any government-specIfied or con-
trolled vIewpomt IS mherently contrary to the whole concept of free 
speech and free press.39 In that sense, counter-advertIsmg IS a dangerous-
ly subversIve proposal. 
15. The Coumer-Advertzsmg Proposal Can Be Explatned Only as a 
Polittcal Power Play 
When examIned analytIcally, the counter-advertIsmg proposal SImply 
makes no sense from the lOgIcal, economIC, or SOCIOlOgIcal vIewpomt. It 
can be understood only when analyzed m politIcal terms. 
38. As JustIce Stewart observed m hiS concurrmg opmlOn m Columbta Broadcasttng: 
''Those who wrote our First Amendment put their faith m the proposltIon that a free 
press IS mdispensable to a free society. They believed that 'fairness' was far too 
fragile to be left for a government bureaucracy to accomplish. History has many 
tImes confirmed the wisdom of their choice." 93 S. Ct. at 2108. 
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The first and most ObVIOUS effect of counter-advertIsmg would be to 
Impose substantial additional cost on broadcastIng and drIve at least 
some advertlSmg away, thus reducmg revenue. By almost any calcula-
tIon, trus would WIpe out the overall profit margm of both radio and 
teleVISIOn. UltImately, because of ever-mcreasmg needs for subSIdy or 
support, broadcastIng would become .subJect to government control. 
Presumably trus process would be gradual, durmg wruch tIme broad-
casters would be mcreasmgly subject to the mfluence and control of the 
most militant and perSIstent counter-advertIsmg advocates.4o These 
groups certamly have reason to believe that government agenCIes wruch 
adopt theIr counter-advertIsmg proposal despIte the strong ObjectIons to 
It will contmue to be responSIve after substantIal control of broadcastmg 
has moved from present management to government. 
Whether counter-advernsmg would result m an expansIOn of what 
now IS referred to as "public broadcastIng" or whether It would produce 
some new form of government subSIdy and control of present commer-
CIal broadcastIng facilitIes IS an urumportant detail. The Impact will 
surely be to transfer effective control from the numerous diverse licen-
sees now operatmg the more than eIght thousand licensed statIons41 to 
some government agency controlled by the politIcal admInIstration of 
39. Although Columbta' Broadcasting resulted m SIX separate Opmtons, It IS notable 
that five JUStices (Burger, Whlte, Blackmun, Powell and RehnqUlSt) thought that the 
proposal for government-mandated access to broadcastmg was contrary to the public 
mterest and mvolved a dangerous exteuslOn of government control over speech, while 
two other JUStices (Douglas and Stewart) thought the danger of extending government 
control over speech was so great as to contravene the first amendment. Only two Jus-
tices (Brennan and Marshall) favored OffiCIally mandated access to broadcastmg facilities. 
In, VIew of the recent disclosures of offiCIal aCtiVIty m the "Watergate" mvestlgatlons, 
one wonders how any believer m democracy can favor any proposal to mcrease govern-
ment power or mfluence over the mass media m any respect. 
40. In Columbta Broadcastmg, the Court noted that broadcasters are likely to be 
more responsible and accountable than those who Importunately seek access to broad-
cast facilities: "No such accountability attaches to the private mdividual, whose only 
qualificatlous for usmg the broadcast facility may be abundant funds and a pomt of 
VIew. To agree that debate on public ISSUes should be 'robust, and wide-open' does not 
mean that we should exchange 'public trustee' broadcasong, WIth all Its limItations, for 
a system of self-appomted editOrial commentators." 93 S. Ct. at 2097-98. 
41. As of May 31, 1973, there were 7,756 commercial radio and teleVISion stations 
and 914 educational FM and televlSlon stations authOrIZed to broadcast, for a total 
of 8,670 authorIZed broadcastmg stations. Of thIS number, 7,538 commercial radio and 
teleVISion stations and 823 educational FM and teleVISion stations were actually on the 
aIr, for a total of 8,361. BROADCASTING, July 9, 1973, at 48. 
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the country and responsIve to the most militant advocates of a favored 
viewpoillt. 
BasIcally, the counter-adverusmg proposal IS Slillply an echo of the 
demand that the power of busmess be curbed and that the power of 
government agencIes and therr politIcally militant supporters be m-
creased. Busmess and Journalism, both prmt and broadcast, are the two 
groups ill contemporary socIety strong enough to offer some sIgmfi.cant 
OppOSItIOn to and CntICISm of government. In recent years, although 
government control of busmess has been extended m many ways, the 
fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press have been mamtamed. 
Further extenSIOn of government controls may endanger these freedoms, 
particularly when such controls are directed at the economIC foundation 
of the Journalism busmess.42 
The FTC IS now busily engaged ill extending ItS power over adver-
tIsmg. If counter-advertIsmg IS mstltuted, government agenCIes will have 
the power to encourage and direct attacks on busmess WIthout any re-
sponsibility for such attacks, and will also have the power to control a 
large part of the public discourse m a manner never before attempted 
ill thIs country The combmatIon of these powers, together WIth ill-
creased economIC power over the broadcastmg medium, would create 
a degree of government control over AmerIcan SOCIal and political life 
that 1S unprecedented m our hIStOry No complamts about advertIsmg 
have ever charged abuses grave enough to Justify such a threat to our 
fundamental rIghts. 
The maSSIve power held by the government should not be mobilized 
for any causes but those havmg genume SOCIal sIgmfi.cance. The abuses 
whIch the FTC now clalills to be attackmg are at worst perIpheral an-
noyances. The damage whIch the FTC proposal may cause to our 
SOCIal, economIC, and politIcal structure IS vastly greater than any mJury 
whIch IS likely to result from the annoyance of advertIsmg abuses. 
The bIg story today IS not what advertlSmg IS domg to politiCS, but 
what politics IS domg to advertIsmg. Politics 1S attemptmg to turn ad-
vertlSlng on ItS head by establishmg counter-advertIsmg, an effort whIch, 
if successful, would change advertIsmg from an illstrument of competI-
tion m a free economy to a servant of government and an mstrument of 
propaganda or government-sanctioned viewpomts. Freedom of the press 
would be endangered, and the political process Itself would run the fISk 
of subverSIOn. Defeat of the counter-advertIsmg proposal will not merely 
42. Compare the statement of the Supreme Court In note 37 supra 'Wtth Grosjean v. 
AmerIcan Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
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save the mstItutIon of advertlSmg and help preserve a competitive econ-
omy, It will also help to preserve the democratic values of Amencan 
politics. 
